Europe is struggling with the resolution of the severe debt crisis and is in the process of overhauling its institutional set up. One element of the reform agenda is the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which is intended to provide liquidity assistance to countries in case financial stability in the Euro Area is at stake. The ESM shall enter into force in July 2012, following ratification of the member states. It will have five instruments at its disposal: direct loans to countries, purchases of assets on the primary or secondary market, contingent credit lines, and funds for bank recapitalization. In this contribution, it is argued that establishing an explicit crisis resolution mechanism is in principle useful. However, the ESM is defined too broadly, and its scope should be limited to the provision of emergency liquidity assistance only under narrowly defined circumstances. Using the option to recapitalize banks might help addressing a potential debt overhang problem. Yet, the current framework has deficiencies in this regard and lacks the necessary backing by complementary institutional reforms, notably a regime for cross-border bank resolution.
1 How It All Began
The introduction of the Euro marked a decisive moment in the process of European integration. Before the adoption of the Euro, focus had been on deepening the Union through increased integration and the creation of a Common Market and on widening the Union by accepting new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1999, a core group of eleven member countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) formed the European Monetary Area and adopted a common currency. Greece (2000) , Slovenia (2006) , Cyprus and Malta (2007) , the Slovak Republic (2008) , and Estonia (2010) joined later on.
It was well understood that the sequence proposed by many, i.e. to form a monetary union only after a political union had been achieved, had not been followed. Yet, there was the hope that the requirements of the new currency would induce governments to pursue policies consistent with the common monetary regime. The facts that only countries fulfilling the Maastricht Criteria could join the Euro and that member states had to adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact was considered to be a sufficient precondition for stability-oriented fiscal policies.
Insufficient consideration was given to the potentially devastating feedback loops between misaligned incentives in the financial sector, overborrowing of the private and the public sector, and the evolution of persistent current account deficits. Yet, past experiences with currency and financial crises could have told a lesson: turbulence in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and the speculation against the British Pound had happened less than a decade ago, and severe banking and exchange rate crises had just shaken the Asian countries as well as other emerging markets in the late 1990s. In fact, the Delors-Reports is quite explicit about the constraints financial markets can impose on economic policy. 2 Now, more than a decade later, the European sovereign debt and banking crisis has revealed three main fault lines of the European institutional architecture.
First, incentives for structural reforms have been insufficient and, as one consequence, price and wage convergence has been limited. While nominal interest rates had converged across countries, relative prices and real interest rates have differed persistently. 3 Microprudential regulation of banks was used to keep checks and balances on private sector borrowing, but without adequately addressing feedback channels between private and public sector risk. Yet, recent experience particularly in Ireland and Spain has shown that financial sector stress can spill over into the fiscal sphere. Many banks in the crises countries have a significant and highly concentrated exposure to sovereign risk. Hence, the rescue measures that have been launched since May 2010 were motivated by the risk of contagion of sovereign risk into the banking sector -not only in the crises countries but also beyond.
Third, the no-bail-out clause has lacked credibility. Article 125 of the Treaty on the European Union "The Lisbon Treaty" (2007) specifies a no-bail-out clause. 4 Article 100 of the EC Treaty stipulates that financial assistance might be granted, but only under exceptional circumstances. 5 Notwithstanding this modification, the strict adherence to the no-bail-out principle is one cornerstone of the institutional framework in the Euro Area. Yet, recent experience shows that diverging trends in competitiveness and weaknesses in the financial systems can lead to speculation against the weaker countries in the Euro Area which may ultimately render the no-bail-out principle to be time inconsistent. Since May 2010, several rescue measures have thus been launched, including bilateral loans to Greece, the successive support packages of the newly established European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for 4 billion € (ESM) with the latter two being limited to a combined lending of not more that 700 billion €.
Correcting the imbalances that have built up in the Euro Area requires deep structural reforms, involving labor market and product market reforms, lower national and international barriers to the entry of (new) firms, and measures to enhance the productivity of firms. In addition to policies improving the competitiveness of firms, reforms are needed that create a more credible framework for financial markets. These reforms should reduce incentives for private and public sector overborrowing while, at the same time, providing a mechanism to deal with financial stress in countries that have sound fundamentals but that come under pressure from financial markets.
In short, Europe stands at the doorstep of encompassing institutional reforms, and the ESM is one part of this reform package. In the following, I briefly summarize the scope of the ongoing institutional reforms, the structure of the ESM, and the conditions under which countries can draw on these funds (Section 2). I then discuss the process of economic convergence in the Euro Area and the mechanisms that have led to external imbalances (Section 3). Section 4 discusses the implications for the ESM. I focus on four aspects: the extent to which the ESM can and should address the debt overhang problem, the extent to which the option of bank recapitalization should be used, the need to focus the ESM on a mechanism that provides liquidity only under very narrowly defined circumstances, and the complementary reforms that are needed in order to strengthen the credibility of the ESM.
Section 5 concludes.
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is a permanent mechanism to ensure financial stability. When designing the conditions under which countries can draw on funds provided by the ESM, two main questions need to be answered: First, how can the available funds be used most effectively, and which instruments should be at the disposal of the ESM? Second, how can financial assistance be provided without reducing the effectiveness of market signals for structural reforms?
These questions cannot be answered without taking into consideration that the ESM is part of an encompassing reform program that the EU has initiated in response to the (sovereign) debt crisis. This program aims at reforming the Stability and Growth Pact, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and stabilizing financial markets. All these policy measures aim at the prevention of crisis in the future. In parallel to that, the EFSF provides a temporary rescue scheme, which will be succeeded by the ESM as a permanent rescue scheme from mid-2012 onwards. The total subscribed capital of the ESM will be 700 billion €, which consists of 80 billion € be paid in capital and 620 billion € callable capital. Due to its overcollateralization, the ESM shall obtain a top rating.
The ESM is activated upon application of one of its member countries for financial assistance.
With this application, the specific financing instrument is specified as well. Details on the use of each instrument are defined by the directorate of the ESM in a set of guidelines. Generally, five instruments are available: The ESM is intended to stabilize financial markets resulting from sovereign risk and banking sector instability. But understanding the potential of the ESM to contain financial instabilities also requires a thorough understanding of the underlying state of the real economy and of the mechanisms that may lead to a build up of unsustainable debt positions. In this section, I take a step back and discuss the economic developments that are behind the current crisis in the Euro Area. I review trends in income and productivity in Europe (Section 3.1), the evolution of interest rates and prices (Section 3.2), the current account and capital flows (Section 3.4), and the role of fiscal transfers in existing currency unions (Section 3.5).
Income and Productivity
Many view the convergence of per capita incomes as a precondition for a functioning monetary union. Yet, economic convergence is a rather gradual process, and differences in Empirical evidence from the European Union (EU) as a whole shows that differences in per capita incomes have decreased gradually up until the 1970s (Boldrin und Canova 2001 , Giannone et al. 2009 ). Convergence has slowed down in recent decades, while differences at the regional level have increased (Sapir et al. 2003 14 Yet, dispersion of unemployment rates is much higher in Europe. While the coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates was 0.25 in the US, the corresponding number was about twice as high in 2010 in Europe (0.47). Or, in absolute terms: while the highest unemployment rate in the US was registered in Nevada (13.5%) 15 , the highest rate in Europe was recorded in Spain (more than 20%). There are many explanations for these differences, but insufficient regional mobility of labor, together with large inter-country variation in structural weaknesses on European labor markets, are certainly important factors.
In addition, productivity and innovation activity differ across European countries. According to Eurostat, labor productivity has diverged considerably across the Euro Area with numbers for Greece (18€), Spain (24€) and Portugal (14€) lying below the values for the Euro Area as a whole (33€) (data are for the year 2010). In terms of expenditure for research and development, European countries fall into three main groups. The highest expenditure relative to GDP are recorded in Germany and in the Scandinavian countries (about 3% of GDP), followed by Austria, the Benelux countries, Estonia, France, Ireland, Slovenia, and the UK 13 The coefficient of variation of real GDP per capita is the standard deviation relative to the mean of real GDP per capita for each individual year in US dollar. The Euro Area comprises Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The numbers given in the text are based on (for Europe) International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, and (for the US) Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts.
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(about 2% of GDP), and the southern and Eastern European countries with less than 1% (OECD 2011) . Using the number of patents or employment in R&D gives a very similar picture. Interestingly, in countries with a low share of R&D investment, a relatively high share of these investments comes from the public sector.
Interest Rates and Relative Prices
While there has been no distinct trend towards real convergence in the Euro Area in recent decades, nominal interest rates have quickly converged following the introduction of the Euro (Figure 1b ). This nominal interest rate convergence has not only affected wholesale markets but also retail interest rates. Figure 2 shows that the standard deviation of interest rates on time deposits has been below 0.1 until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007; standard deviations of loan rates have been a bit higher. The graph also shows that the convergence of nominal interest rates has come to an abrupt end leading to a widening of spreads due to the sovereign debt and banking crises.
Nominal interest rate convergence reflected the elimination of exchange rate risk and a convergence of inflationary expectations (Ehrmann et al. 2011) . Nominal interest rates are the annual average rates of return on fixed rate government bonds with a residual maturity of at least 3 years. The inflation rate refers to the harmonized consumer price index.
Sources: Sachverständigenrat, ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, own calculations. The graph shows the coefficient of variation, i.e. the standard deviation relative to the mean interest rates, across Euro Area countries. Short-term credits are those with a residual maturity of less than one year. Data for the year 2011 are as of September.
Sources: European Central Bank (ECB) Statistical Data Warehouse, own calculations.
Nominal interest rate convergence can be problematic if real economic developments diverge.
Together with diverging price and wage developments, nominal interest rate convergence leads to differences in real interest rates. In countries where prices increase faster than in the rest of the currency area, real interest rates are low, and firms, households, or governments have incentives to borrow. Table 1 shows the evolution of private and public sector debt in % of GDP. In the Euro Area as a whole, public debt has increased from about 73 to 81% from the second half of the 1990s until the crises years (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . Developments across countries differ. While the steepest increased occurred in Greece (from 96 to 138%), public debt in Ireland or Spain has been below the 60% threshold before the crisis but increased during the crisis because of the instabilities in the financial sector. Private sector debt increased by almost 20 percentage points as well for the Euro Area as a whole (from 47 to 66%), with above-average values in Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
The central bank, in turn, has limited means to counteract such diverging developments because it sets its policy interest rates for the currency union as a whole. Hence, it cannot counteract diverging regional price and wage developments. Just as the ECB lacks instruments to affect regional prices and wage developments, it also lacks tools to directly supervise the banks that take recourse to its refinancing operations. Since the beginning of the European debt crisis in May 2010, the ECB has successively changed the conditions under which banks can obtain access to central bank refinancing by changing the collateral framework and the margin requirements. Several banks, the so-called "persistent bidders", rely on ECB funding almost exclusively. The discussion about the role, the interpretation, and the possible policy implications of the Target II (im)balances is one facet of this debate. These balances are related to the underlying weaknesses of the real economies, i.e. current account imbalances within the Euro Area which are not financed entirely by private capital flows. They also reflect weaknesses in the financial sector that leads to capital flight. Several commercial banks in the crisis countries cannot fund their operations on private capital market and thus resort to liquidity support from the ECB.
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Diverging price developments not only lead to differences in real interest rates but also to changes in relative prices. Even within a currency union, in which nominal exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, relative prices (the "real exchange rate") can diverge. If prices, say, in
Greece increase faster than in the rest of the Euro Area, exports of Greek firms become relatively more expensive while imports from the Euro Area into Greece become relatively cheaper. The Greek real exchange rate has thus appreciated in real terms, which corresponds to a loss in competitiveness of Greek firms on international markets. 18 Neary (2006) discusses the link between the real exchange rate and the "competitiveness" of a country. There are two main adjustment mechanisms to realign real exchange rates. In the short-run, prices and wages have to adjust (internal devaluation) or the nominal exchange rate can adjust (external devaluation). In the medium-to long-term, productivity needs to increase.
Countries that are members of the Euro Area cannot use the nominal exchange rate to achieve the needed realignment of the real exchange rate. Hence, adjustment has to fall on prices and wages. The ability to achieve the required revaluation of wages and thus of real incomes depends on the political support for such measures and the institutional framework. In fact, many factors which obstruct internal devaluation could also prevent sustained effects of an external devaluation. (Kohler (2012) , for instance, makes this point.)
Previous empirical work on the degree of wage flexibility in Europe hints at potential institutional shortcomings. Dickens et al. (2007) 20 The link between real exchange rates and per capita incomes as a measure for productivity has been analyzed in detail by Berka and Devereux (2010) . They show that, in Europe, this link has become stronger with the introduction of the Euro and that it is stronger for tradables than for non-tradables.
14 results indicate that deep structural reforms are required in the Euro Area in order to realign prices and wages with economic fundamentals.
Current Accounts and Capital Flows
Although public discussions describe the current situation in Europe as a (sovereign) debt crisis, it can in fact also be seen as a full-fledged intra-European balance of payments crisis.
Diverging patterns of real interest rates and of real exchange rates have been associated with widening current account imbalances in the Euro Area. Generally, current account imbalances and the corresponding capital flows are one adjustment mechanism to shocks and to differences in real incomes. During a longer-term catching up process, poorer countries or regions should be expected to import foreign capital (and thus to run current account deficits) and to repay their foreign debts through current account surpluses in the future. Access to international capital markets can also provide countries with a short-run insurance mechanism, allowing them to buffer short-run fluctuations in incomes. Hence, in integrated financial markets, income shocks have a weaker impact on consumption patterns than in a closed
economy.
Yet, reaping the benefits of international financial integration in the form of faster economic convergence and of insurance against income fluctuations is possible only if financial frictions and incentives to overborrow are limited. In addition to informational frictions that are prevalent on domestic capital markets as well, sovereign risk adds an additional friction on international capital markets: here, the borrower remains sovereign, and the collection of collateral in the case of default is often not possible. Hence, in an international context, it is not only the ability of borrowers to pay but also their willingness to pay that matters (Eaton et al. 1986 ). The threat not to repay and to default increases the borrower's bargaining power (Bulow and Rogoff 1989) . The implicit price borrowers have to pay for this sovereignty is the risk of a sudden stop of capital flows in case creditors expect a sovereign default. The quite significant reversal of capital flows to some European countries suggests that these mechanisms have been at play in the Euro Area.
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It is a key challenge for empirical research to disentangle the extent to which current account imbalances in the Euro Area reflect a normal adjustment process and are thus a signal of increased market integration and to what extent they reflect excessive borrowing and lending on international capital markets. Table 2 shows that current account deficits in the Euro Area have tended to widen since the introduction of the Euro. Partly, these deficits reflect increased financial integration, but partly they also reflect excessive borrowing. While the current account of the Euro Area towards the rest of the world has largely been balanced since 1999, there are two distinct groups of countries. The capital exporters comprise the northern European countries, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. The capital importers (with current account deficits) comprise the southern European countries Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In the case of Spain and Ireland, capital imports have been accompanied by increased investment rates; in the case of Greece and Portugal, they were driven by an increase in consumption (Deutsche Bundesbank 2010). In the course of the crisis, the current account deficits in the Euro Area have to some extent narrowed down. This adjustment has been driven primarily by a reduction in domestic demand rather than an adjustment of relative prices. The international indebtedness of the crisis countries has thus increased in recent years. Some countries carry a net foreign debt burden of a magnitude similar to their GDP (Figure 3 ). Italy with a high debt burden of the government vis-à-vis domestic residents is an exception. The bulk of foreign liabilities is in the form of fixed income assets (bank debt plus bonds). The share of foreign direct investment and of other equity investments is relative small, and it has declined over time. Recent studies conclude that the introduction of the Euro has promoted capital market integration in Europe. 22 However, most of these studies do not cover the crisis period.
Empirical studies show that the tendency of lower-income countries to import and of higherincome countries to export capital has become stronger after the introduction of the Euro 
Fiscal Transfers
In discussions about the future of the Euro Area, it is often argued that successful currency unions have strong fiscal transfer systems which help cushioning shocks to short-term income.
If a member country (or region) of a currency union is hit by an adverse shock, the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust to realign prices. Hence, fiscal transfers may be needed in order to provide a short-term insurance mechanism and to ensure a certain degree of burden sharing.
Such fiscal insurance systems must be distinguished conceptually from long-run redistributive mechanisms which help reducing differences in per capita incomes. Such redistributive transfers are not necessarily motivated by the special conditions of a monetary union. But, of course, any transfer system will also have some redistributive elements, and it is thus a political question how much redistribution and risk sharing is desired.
Existing systems of interregional fiscal burden sharing differ. In the US, ad hoc transfers are Empirical studies analyze whether fiscal transfers serve the main purpose of insuring against short-term shocks or if they are contributing to narrower income differentials in the longer-run.
These studies start by distinguishing short-run from long-run fluctuations of income and then ask to what extent households can shield consumption from such fluctuations of income, i.e.
"insure" against them. In the US, only about 16% of short-term income fluctuations across states affect consumption while the corresponding number of long-run fluctuations is higher (49%) (Becker and Hoffmann 2006) . But only a relative small share of this consumption risk sharing is achieved via fiscal transfers; the bulk of insurance comes through the integration of capital and labor markets. 24 Cross-state-border ownership of firms and thus a relatively high degree of integration of equity markets, for instance, plays an important role. In addition, it is important to note that the no-bail-out principle has been adhered to quite strictly in the United
States. Most US states have constitutional balanced budget rules, and the states are treated as sovereign entities.
In Germany, the importance of different adjustment channels has changed over time. In the years 1970-1994, fiscal transfers have accounted for a share of 50% of consumption risk sharing across state borders (Hepp and von Hagen 2011) . Factor and credit markets accounted for insurance against about 36% of income shocks. In the post-unification period, about 63% (53%) of shocks have been smoothened via markets in West Germany (East Germany) and only 15% (19%) through fiscal insurance mechanisms. These numbers are roughly comparable to those observed for the US (Astrubali et al. 1995) .
Summing Up
This section has shown that countries can share the same currency even though there are differences in per capita incomes. Real economic convergence is not a necessary precondition for a monetary union while, of course, a higher degree of convergence eases the adjustment to adverse shocks. Tensions can arise for the following reasons: First, diverging price and wage developments within a currency union can lead to persistent divergence in competitiveness.
Second, because nominal exchange rates cannot be used as a buffer against adverse business cycle fluctuations, alternative mechanisms such as sufficiently integrated and flexible factor markets or fiscal transfer system are required. Third, if market participants expect bailouts by other members of the currency area, interest rates may not fully reflect the underlying risk premia, which may create incentives for overborrowing.
These considerations have several implications for the environment in which the ESM will operate. The ESM per se will not affect the real economic conditions in the Euro Area, but its institutional design may affect the incentives to engage in the structural reforms that are necessary to realign real developments. Moreover, the impact of ESM funding on financial 
Dealing with Debt Overhang
The scope of the ESM is defined fairly broadly. Article 18 states that "Decisions on interventions on the secondary market to address contagion shall be taken on the basis of an analysis of the ECB recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability". At the same time, the ESM shall providing financial support under well-defined criteria only: "The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality."
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One potential use of ESM funds is to deal with debt overhang. While the exact amount of debt overhang in Europe is not known, the mechanisms that have been described so far have caused excessive borrowing of the private and of the public sector. Some of this excess debt has been written off, but an excess debt burden is also likely to be carried forward on banks'
and other investors' balance sheets. Quantifying potentially non-performing assets is difficult:
information on loan forbearance is scarce, the quality of banks' assets crucially depends on the state of the economy and on interlinkages in the financial system, and there may be 20 multiple equilibria. Hence, there might be situation where economic fundamental do not differ but, depending on the beliefs of market participants, a crisis may or may not occur. Not least, incentives of debtors and borrowers matter.
Hence, the ESM will become effective at a time when a large part of the bad debts are still outstanding. Inevitably, the ESM will deal not only with the flow but also with a stock problem of bad debts. However, if the ESM aims at preventing a fundamental revaluation of assets in the Euro Area, it is hardly conceivable how this goal could be achieved. Recent experience rather suggests that there will be continued pressure on the ECB to support malfunctioning financial markets and banks through the provision of liquidity support. It has in fact been argued that the ECB is the only institution in Europe which can prevent a melt down of asset prices in case the financial crisis worsens by, for instance, announcing that it will buy up all government bonds up to certain percentage of a country's GDP. 28 The ESM may not only lack the funding to buy up a sufficient volume of assets and thus to stabilize asset prices, decision making will also be too slow in times of acute financial stress. This limits the potential for the ESM to act as a lender of last resort. (Kohler (2012) makes a similar point.)
The decisions of the ECB to purchase government bonds directly or to relax collateral standards indicate its willingness and ability to act as a lender of last resort. According to the so-called Bagehot principle, however, a lender of last resort should lend at a sufficiently high penalty rate to solvent but illiquid banks that have adequate collateral. In the current crisis, both of these conditions have been violated: the ECB currently lends at a low rate, and the quality standards for collateral in ECB refinancing operations have been weakened over time.
There is thus a growing concern that risks have been shifted from the financial and from the public sector onto the ECB's balance sheets. Recent announcements of the ECB to tighten lending standards and to induce governments to restructure banks essentially acknowledge these risks. At the same time, the ECB has practically no instruments at its disposal to enforce strict fiscal rules or to impose prudential regulations on banks. Hence, the task of stabilizing the banks should gradually be moved from the ECB to the fiscal authorities.
With the ESM having limited funds to address the stock problem of outstanding debt and the adoption of additional risks through the ECB being problematic, alternative solutions need to be found. One proposal of how to deal with the public debt overhang has been made by the 
Bank Recapitalization and Restructuring
There is a long-standing tradition of discussing whether conditions in the real economy affect conditions in the financial sector, or vice versa. In the current situation in Europe, this discussion is largely an academic one. Clearly, problems on European debt markets cannot be addressed without, in the long-run, improving the underlying real economic conditions while, in the short-run, ensuring a sufficient capitalization of European banks is crucial in order to prevent negative feedback effects for the real economy. Evidence from other world regions, in particular from Japan during the past two decades, shows that delaying a solution might be costly in terms of misaligned incentives in the financial system that can lead to a misallocation of real resources (see, e.g., Caballero et al. 2008, or Peek and Rosengren 2005) .
Recent policy decisions to improve the capitalization of banks are thus a step into the right direction, although care should be taken that regulations are not tightened during the crisis and that banks have a sufficient adjustment period.
Private funds either in the form of retained earnings or through new issuances of equity should certainly have priority in strengthening the capital buffer of banks. In line with this, funds for recapitalization are available under the EFSF and the ESM only if other, private and public, sources of funds are not available. Yet, these private funds may turn out to be insufficient, and a deterioration of the economic environment may require a higher volume of recapitalization. In such a situation, the case can be made that governments should stand ready to support ailing financial institutions in order to prevent contagion effects (Academic Advisory Council BMWi 2008). This would also reduce pressure on the ECB to support distressed banks. Bank recapitalization in the crisis countries may also be desirable from the point of view of overall financial stability. Hence, solutions for the Euro Area as a whole must be sought.
Bank recapitalization through the national government may not be forthcoming at a sufficient scale for several reasons though. Most importantly, countries in which banks are in need of capital support are also the countries in which governments have the least room to manoeuvre, given their own dire financial state. Therefore, governments in the crisis countries may be unable to support their banks on a stand alone basis. While funding for bank recapitalization is in principle available through the ESM, the incentives of governments to apply for bank recapitalization funds under Article 15 are thus limited. Taking up such support could be taken as a negative signal to financial markets concerning the financial state of the sovereign, 22 thus negatively affecting market access for banks and sovereigns. 30 Moreover, funding for bank recapitalization is conditional upon the specification of a plan on how to restructure the country's banking system. In order to be effective, such bank restructuring plan may require the consolidation of a country's financial system thus raising opposition by affected stakeholders. Finally, bank recapitalization in one country might induce competitive distortions. Banks in the non-crisis countries might thus lobby against support for crisis banks if they fear that such support measures might distort the competitive environment on European banking markets.
Hence, there is the risk that, although bank recapitalization may be desirable for overall financial stability, such considerations might prevent a concerted solution. These arguments speak in favour of taking concerted action at the EU level and of closely involving European competition authorities in order to prevent a distortion of market structures.
No matter whether bank restructuring and supervision is a national or an international task, the rules under which public capital support is granted must be clearly defined, and it must be clear that public ownership in the banks is a crisis management tool. The goals of any bank recapitalization program should be (i) to restore the functioning of financial markets as quickly and as broadly as possible, (ii) to generate the least possible distortions facing private market participants, and (iii) to keep costs to the tax payer as small as possible.
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In addition, the following aspects need to be considered.
First, bank restructuring and recapitalization should take place in the context of a well defined cross-border resolution regime for banks. In the medium-to longer-run, this also requires the establishment of a European deposit insurance and resolution fund.
Second, using the financial resources available under the ESM to recapitalize banks might solve the problem that a European solution requires sufficient funding in the short-run. By affecting the liabilities' side of banks' balance sheets rather than trying to support asset values through purchases on the primary or secondary market, a given volume of funds could be used more efficiently. Banks would obtain leeway to restructure their balance sheets and to write off non-performing assets, which may be loans to the private sector as well as government bonds.
Third, under the present legal framework, application for a specific financial instrument is done by the countries themselves. For reasons outlined above, the individual country may not have an incentive to apply for recapitalization funds. Markets could take such an application as a signal that the government has insufficient funds to support its country's banks. Instead, pressure to apply for bank recapitalization funds could come through the ECB or the EBA, 23 which already call for national governments to provide backstop facilities for their banking systems. As regards application for recapitalization funds, it could be considered to assign a more active role to the European Banking Authority (EBA).
Fourth, bank recapitalization is no panacea. Instead, it needs to go hand in hand with a thorough review of the quality of banks' assets, with a restructuring of banks, and, if needed, adjustment of market structures. Evidence from Japan is particularly instructive in this context. 32 Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) review the experience from bank restructuring in Japan and derive the following lessons: banks often refrain from accepting capital support measures because they fear negative signalling effects and thus lack of access to private capital markets;
rescue packages need to have a sufficient scale; asset purchase programs are of limited effectiveness; a thorough audit of banks' assets and a restructuring of non-performing assets are required; a powerful and adequate resolution authority must be in place; capital support measures through the government run the risk of promoting politically motivated lending; and, finally, macroeconomic growth is crucial for a recovery of banks.
Fifth, the conditions under which public support is given to banks should be clearly specified.
Under a high degree of uncertainty about the conditions of public involvement, private investors are unlikely to provide sufficient additional funds. Moreover, if banks do not meet regulatory capital requirements, payments of dividends and other payments to shareholders should be restricted in order to prevent the depletion of funds.
Finally, institutions receiving financial support from their government should be supervised by politically independent institutions. Many governments in Europe face a conflict of interest:
on the one hand, the domestic banks are important buyers of domestic sovereign debt. There is in fact evidence of a substantial degree of home preference in banks' (sovereign debt) portfolios, which has even tended to increase during the crisis (Giannetti and Laeven 2011 , Hildebrand et al. 2012 , Rose and Wieladek 2011 . On the other hand, institutions linked to the government are assigned the task to supervise the banks and to disclose potential problems.
These considerations strengthen the case for an independent European supervisor.
Limiting the Role of the ESM to a Crisis Mechanism
It has been argued above that the ESM lacks resources and sufficient speed in decision making to serve as a general lender of last resort. Hence, the question remains as to what the actual role of the ESM should be. The ESM is part of a new institutional framework which builds on strengthened fiscal surveillance, enforced fiscal policy rules, and strengthened banking regulations. But even if all these policies succeed, there is still the risk that situations of (fiscal) distress occur because of unforeseen shocks or changes in market sentiment. In order to avoid being taken by surprise, the credibility of the new framework can be enhanced by establishing clear guidelines of how to deal with countries in distress. This is, in essence, the purpose of an insolvency regime for countries. Such a regime needs to establish clear mechanisms for debt restructuring and a mechanism to provide bridge-financing for countries undergoing such restructuring. While outlining the details of an insolvency regime is beyond the scope of this contribution, most proposals that have been made involve some type of credit mechanisms providing such sources of finance. (See, e.g., Academic Advisory Council BMWi (2011a), Sachverständigenrat (2011 ), or Bruegel (2010 .).
Such a credit mechanism as part of an insolvency regime must be distinguished from funds that are used to generally stabilize prices of government bonds of selected Euro Area member countries. Buying bonds on the secondary market in order to ensure the proper functioning of financial markets is likely to prove insufficient in situations of financial market distress. It is likely to generate speculation on further interventions, and eventually render the funds available to the ESM as being insufficient. The ongoing discussions about leveraging the ESM, to increase the firewalls, and to provide the ESM with direct access to central bank refinancing by giving it a banking license show that this mechanism is already at work.
Unless the causes of the debt problems, i.e. the weaknesses of the real economies and the resulting banking sector problems are addressed, there will be continued pressure on the ECB to assume the role of a "lender of last resort". Not least, overburdening the ESM might eventually also have negative effects for the borrowing capacities of the stronger Euro Area members.
Instead, lending through the ESM should take place only under strict conditionality and only in the context of a well-defined debt restructuring procedure. Lending through the ESM will always involve an element of moral hazard because it allows sharing the burden of excessive borrowing in the past. It is thus all the more important to ensure that creditors have the right incentives in the future.
The claim that ESM funding should provide short-term liquidity assistance only to countries undergoing debt restructuring is often considered unrealistic, given the difficulties with private sector involvement in the case of Greece. Yet, this argument overlooks that the Greek debt restructuring took place in a situation in which most outstanding government bonds did not include collective action clauses. Hence, such clauses had to be imposed ex post and in the context of a high degree of pre-existing uncertainty on financial markets. In future debt restructuring cases, collective action clauses would be the norm, thus reducing uncertainty on part of the creditors and ensuring a more orderly debt restructuring. Also, debt restructuring in the case of Greece was announced in parallel to other policy measures at the European level, such as the decision of the EBA in the fall of 2011 to increase capital requirements for banks.
Hence it is difficult to isolate the impact of debt restructuring on bond markets and prices.
Limiting the role of the ESM to well-defined cases of liquidity support implies that the ESM would not play a major role as a redistributive or shock absorbing mechanism. It will not substitute for a system of fiscal transfers. There are several reasons why a higher volume of fiscal transfers -be it through the ESM, through a system comparable to the German interstate fiscal transfer system (Länderfinanzausgleich), or be it through some form of Eurobonds is neither desirable nor necessary at the European level. It has already been argued above that fiscal transfers in existing currency unions play a limited role when it comes to the smoothing of short-run business cycle fluctuations (Section 3.4). In addition, there are four arguments which need to be considered when discussing the role of fiscal transfers in Europe.
First, there are good reasons to believe that the full potential for countries to insure against income fluctuations via capital and labor markets remains unexploited in Europe. Enhanced labor market integration and the opening up of protected sectors such as in services can provide additional flexibility. Enhanced integration of equity markets can provide an insurance mechanism through cross-border profit sharing. Obviously, market-based insurance mechanisms are not available to or not used by all households. For households not benefiting from direct participation in international capital markets, social security systems can provide the necessary within-country insurance mechanisms. Within-country insurance mechanisms can provide insurance against, for instance, unemployment to the extent that shocks hitting firms and workers are sector-specific or region-specific but not country-specific.
Second, enforcement of stricter fiscal rules through the Fiscal Compact and the strengthened Stability and Growth Pact will certainly limit the ability of governments to use anti-cyclical fiscal policies quantitatively. But these new rules do not prevent governments from running fiscal surpluses in goods times, which can be used to buffer adverse income shocks in bad times, and from allowing automatic stabilizers to work.
Third, fiscal transfers bear the risk of reducing incentives to reform and thus to become persistent. Empirical evidence shows that fiscal transfers have tended to delay labor market adjustment (Boldrin und Canova 2001 , Obstfeld und Peri 1998 , that social transfers in
Europe have contributed to a convergence of incomes only in some countries (Bouvet 2010) , and that income levels in poorer regions tend to converge to those in richer regions while differences in productivity or in employment growth tend to persist (Becker et al. 2010a , Checherita et al. 2009 ).
Last but not least, adopting existing fiscal transfer systems in Europe to levels comparable to, for instance, the German situation would be very costly, and this is likely to lack political support. Across German states, about 90% of differences in per capita tax receipts are redistributed (Konrad and Zschäpitz 2011) . Implementing similar system of tax equalization in Europe would imply a massive increase of the EU budget. This is likely to be opposed politically not only among the existing members of the Euro Area. It may also raise the issue 26 of whether increased fiscal transfers should be confined to the core Euro Area countries or whether other EU members -notably in Eastern Europe -should be included as well.
Improved Banking Regulation as a Complementary Reform
For the ESM to become part of an efficient and credible crisis resolution mechanism in the longer-run, it needs to be backed by a stronger and more resilient financial and banking system. In this regard, three reforms are crucial.
First, strengthening the capital base of banks not only reduces the probability of individual bank failures; it also strengthens the stability of the financial sector as such and reduces the probability of a systemic crisis. 33 Poorly capitalized banks, if hit by a negative shock, need to divest a large share of their assets in order to restore solvency and to prevent regulatory intervention in the short-run. If all banks are hit by similar shocks and adjust in a similar fashion, this will trigger downward spirals of prices and markets. 34 Hence, higher bank capital can reduce the large multipliers seen in the recent crisis that translate seemingly small initial shocks into system-wide distress of financial institutions.
Second, the current framework of calculating the capital requirements of banks on the basis of risk-weighted assets should be reformed. Risk weights are based on banks' internal risk models which, by definition, cannot take system-wide developments and counterparty risk sufficiently into account. Risk weights are backward-looking by their very nature because they are calculated based on past data. This suggests that a capital requirement, which is not based on risk weights, the so-called leverage ratio, should be implemented. In the context of the ESM, the current plans to maintain zero risk weights on governments bonds issued by Euro Area governments when translating the new Basel III regime into European Law (CRD IV) are particularly problematic. For a given set of assets with similar default probabilities, banks will have an incentive to invest into government bonds. Additional incentives to invest into government bonds result from liquidity regulations and from the ability to use these assets as collateral for central bank refinancing. Yet, the current situation shows that sovereign exposures are risky, and this should be reflected in risk weights. Moreover, applying zero risk weights to sovereign debt could prove inconsistent with future private sector involvement in debt restructuring.
Third, higher capital requirements alone will not make the banking and financial system more stable. Instead, complementary reforms are needed that include a special resolution regime for banks which eases the unwinding of balance sheet positions and imposes penalties on equity owners. Intervention and resolution mechanisms need to be coordinated internationally. Also, the Second Pillar of the Basel framework should be enhanced in order to strengthen discretionary power to detect and prevent regulatory arbitrage. This is particularly important in order to mitigate the incentives for regulatory arbitrage and for an evasion to the shadow banking system, which are inherent in any proposal for stricter regulations.
It is often argued that higher capital requirements are costly for the real economy because they increase banks' costs of funding, lower credit for the real economy, or increase the costs of borrowing for firms. Yet, higher capital requirements, being phased in gradually and backed by complementary reforms of the governance of the financial sector, need not be costly (see, e.g., Admati et al. 2010 . Banks can adjust to higher capital requirements not only by shrinking their balance sheets. They can also raise new equity to support unchanged or even higher total assets. When comparing the costs of debt and equity finance, it should also be taken into consideration that many tax systems favour debt finance compared to equity finance. If capital requirements are increased, the cost of equity finance might even fall: If, as a result of the regulatory change, banks invest into less risky assets, the risk premium on equity finance falls. Empirical studies show that the costs of higher capital requirements for the real economy in terms of higher lending rates are modest in the mid-to longer-term (see Kashayp et al. 2010 for a summary of the evidence). Moreover, these costs must be weighted against the benefits in terms of increased financial stability: for a given risk structure of assets, banking risks would be buffered by higher capital stocks. It is interesting to note in this context that, historically, capital levels of banks have been significantly above the levels currently observed (Alessandri and Haldane 2009) without impeding economic growth or innovation.
5 Summary: What Next?
The Euro Area is in the transition to a new institutional regime. Policy makers are currently setting the course for a future institutional framework combining more stringent crisis prevention tools with an explicit crisis resolution mechanism. In July 2012, the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) shall become operational with a maximum lending capacity of 500 billion € and a set of five financing tools. In this contribution, I have argued that a successful operation of the ESM has four key requirements:
First, in the medium-to long-run, the ESM should be restricted to being an institution that provides liquidity assistance to countries restructuring their (public) debt and thus losing temporary access to financial markets. In order to prevent the ESM from bailing out private investors, private sector involvement will be crucial. If financial support was not conditioned upon private sector involvement, the principle of liability in debt contracts would be violated.
Under conditions of very tight ex ante conditionality, the case for access to precautionary credit lines has been made as well. Experience of the IMF with such credit lines as well as the difficulties of imposing ex ante conditionality suggests though that such credit lines are unlikely to be of much importance. In any case, measures to limit moral hazard associated 28 with any credit mechanism must be taken. It is thus important to condition access to ESM funds on the implementation of the Fiscal Compact and of the European surveillance framework. Also, countries' access to ESM funds should be conditional upon the enforcement of a strict regime of banking regulation and supervision. If, in contrast, the aim is to use the ESM as a general mechanism to stabilize financial markets and to buy securities on primary or secondary markets, this would eventually overburden even its stronger members.
Second, in order to make the transition to a new institutional environment succeed, clear mechanisms need to be specified that prevent the ESM from being burdened with legacies from the past in the form of debt overhang. In the short-run, policymakers need to find losssharing mechanisms in order to deal with the debt overhang problem. This will involve difficult political decisions, but delaying a solution is unlikely to diminish the problem.
Letting the ECB take over the losses might seem an easy solution -but the potential loss of central bank credibility will have detrimental effects. Pressure on the ECB to provide liquidity is unlikely to subside unless the problem of private and public sector debt overhang is addressed.
Third, using Euro Area wide funds for the recapitalization of banks is one possibility to deal with non-performing assets of banks and the debt overhang problem. It would also allow the banks to write off of such assets. Yet, governments are unlikely to invoke the recapitalization option within the current framework of the ESM because they risk sending out negative signals regarding their own financial situation. Therefore, mechanisms should be sought that move the decision which banks to recapitalize at least partially away from the national level.
At the same time, bank recapitalization can succeed only if banks' portfolios are carefully audited, if corporate governance structures of banks are reviewed, and, if eventually market structures adjust. All this involves close cooperation between supervisory institutions at the national and at the EU level. In order to effectively recapitalize and restructure Euro Area banks, the cross-border resolution regime needs to be improved.
Fourth, in order to address the underlying weaknesses and imbalances in the real economy, significant structural reforms are needed. This involves the removal of national and international barriers to entry, labor market reforms, and product market reforms. Enhanced fiscal rules need better enforcement than similar rules in the past. Complementary reforms in the financial sector are needed. In this context, zero risk weights in government bonds as currently envisaged in EU banking regulations are inconsistent with private sector involvement in future debt restructuring cases. Most importantly, better capitalized banks will contribute to enhanced financial stability, thus reducing the probability that ESM funds will have to be used in order to restore financial stability.
